I consider a uniform-price auction of multiple objects under complete information. The possibility of resale attracts speculators who have no use value for the objects on sale. A high-value bidder may strictly prefer to let a speculator win some of the objects on sale and then buy in the resale market, in order to keep the auction price low. Although resale induces entry by speculators and therefore increases the number of competitors, high-value bidders'incentives to "reduce demand" are also a¤ected. Allowing resale to attract speculators reduces the seller's revenue when bidders' valuations are dispersed. The presence of speculators increases the seller's revenue only when speculators are outbid.
Introduction
When resale after an auction is allowed, speculators -players who have no use value for the object on sale -may participate in the hope of winning the auction and then reselling to a bidder who has a high use value for the object. 1 However, it is not clear why a bidder with a high use value should let a speculator win the auction, only then to buy from him in the resale market. Indeed, in a single-object auction with complete information, a bidder is indi¤erent between buying in the resale market and winning the auction (at the same price at which he can buy in the resale market). 2 If there is an arbitrarily small cost to trade in the resale market, or if players discount the future surplus from resale, then the bidder strictly prefers to outbid the speculator and win the auction. 3 I analyze how the possibility of resale and the presence of speculators a¤ect the seller's revenue in multi-object auctions. I show that, in contrast to single-object auctions, under complete information it is natural to expect speculators to win in multi-object auctions: bidders with positive use values may strictly prefer to let a speculator acquire some of the objects on sale, and then purchase those objects in the resale market. By letting a speculator win, bidders may keep the auction price low, and hence pay a lower price for the objects that they acquire in the auction. Therefore, it can be common knowledge that speculators will win an auction, even when competing against bidders with higher use values, and even if there are (small) resale costs and discounting.
Speculators can also win when some bidders with positive use values cannot participate in the auction and can only acquire the objects in the resale market, as with treasury bill auctions and large real-estate auctions (Bikhchandani and Huang, 1989; Bose and Deltas, 1999) . But I show that speculators may win even if all bidders with positive use values participate in the auction. Moreover, in my model resale is not caused by uncertainty in valuations, or by changes in bidders'valuations after the auction (as in Haile, 2000 Haile, , 2003 . 1 A speculator can also be de…ned as a player who has a positive but low use value, and only participates in the auction to resell to a player with a higher use value.
2 Consider, for example, an ascending auction with one bidder who has value v for the object on sale and one speculator who has value 0. If the speculator wins the auction and players equally share the gains from trade in the resale market, the speculator resells to the bidder at price 1 2 v. Therefore, the speculator is willing to bid up to 1 2 v in the auction. Similarly, the bidder is also willing to bid up to 1 2 v, because this is the price at which she can buy in the resale market. So there are multiple equilibria but the bidder has no compelling reason to let the speculator win the auction. (If the bidder bids up to her willingness to pay, the speculator should expect to obtain no surplus and so has no reason to participate in the auction.) 3 Nevertheless, a recent literature shows how resale may arise in richer models of single-object auctions. Garratt and Tröger (2006) show that, if a bidder is privately informed about her use value, in second-price auctions there are also equilibria in undominated strategies in which a speculator wins by inducing the bidder to bid zero. Pagnozzi (2007) shows that a high-value bidder may prefer to let a low-value bidder win if the auction price a¤ects bargaining in the resale market because of wealth e¤ects. Resale can also take place if bidders'valuations change after the auction (Haile, 2000 (Haile, , 2003 , if additional buyers appear after the auction (Milgrom, 1987) , and in …rst-price auctions with asymmetric bidders (Gupta and Lebrun, 1999; Hafalir and Krishna, 2008) .
As an example, consider the 2003 U.K. 3.4 GHz auction, a simultaneous ascending auction for 15 licenses to o¤er broadband wireless services. Paci…c Century Cyberworks (PCCW) was widely considered the highest-value bidder and was expected to win all 15 licenses. Red Spectrum and Public Hub were two small companies created explicitly to participate in the auction, and neither company ever bid for more than one license. As soon as PCCW, Red Spectrum and Public Hub were the only three bidders left in the auction, PCCW reduced its demand to 13 licenses, thus allowing Red Spectrum and Public Hub to win one license each and preventing the auction price from rising any further. 4 A few months after the auction, PCCW obtained the …nal two licenses by taking over Red Spectrum and Public Hub. My analysis provides one plausible interpretation of the bidders'behavior (although other explanations cannot be ruled out, of course).
It is often argued that speculators always increase the seller's revenue, because their participation increases the number of bidders, and hence enhances competition. So, it is argued, the seller should always allow resale and welcome speculators. As the previous example suggests, however, attracting speculators also a¤ects bidders'strategies. Speculators can induce bidders with positive use values to bid more aggressively in order to win the auction, and so increase the seller's revenue. But the possibility of resale also a¤ects bidders'incentives to "reduce demand" -i.e., to bid for fewer objects than they want, in order to pay a lower price for the objects they win -which can reduce the seller's revenue (Wilson, 1979) . 5 There are three e¤ects. First, resale can correct an ine¢ cient allocation, and so makes demand reduction less costly for the higher-value bidders, because they can buy in the resale market the object they lose to a speculator in the auction. Second, it is more costly for a bidder to outbid lower-value competitors, who bid more aggressively when they can resell. These two e¤ects make demand reduction more pro…table for bidders. However, by attracting speculators resale may make demand reduction less pro…table for some bidders with positive use values, if they have to share the objects with speculators.
Speculators do increase competition in the auction. But to attract speculators the seller has to allow resale, and this may induce an accommodating strategy by bidders with positive use 4 See "UK Operators Miss Out in Wireless Broadband Auction" (available at http : ==news:zdnet:co:uk=communications=0; 39020336; 2136110; 00:htm) where PCCW's failure to win all 15 licenses was described as a "surprise," a "ga¤e," and "a costly mistake [that] may have cost the chance of o¤ering a nationwide service." 5 The literature on demand reduction also includes Ausubel and Cramton (1998) , Back and Zender (1993) , Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) , Klemperer and Meyer (1989) , Kremer and Nyborg (2004) , and Noussair (1995) . Kagel and Levin (2001) and List and Lucking-Reiley (2000) provide experimental evidence of demand reduction; Weber (1997) , Wolfram (1998) , and Wolak (2003) argue that demand reduction a¤ected several FCC spectrum auctions, as well as the UK and the California electricity markets; Klemperer (2004) describes demand reduction in the 1999 GSM spectrum auction in Germany and in the 2000 3G spectrum auction in Austria. According to Milgrom (2004) , " [t] he issue of extreme price equilibria is plainly of great practical importance." values and thus reduce the seller 's revenue. 6 To analyze the e¤ects described above, I consider a simple model of a uniform-price auction in which bidders have constant marginal valuations, and these valuations are common knowledge.
This implies that players always exploit pro…table trade opportunities after the auction and that, when they participate in the auction, they can predict the price at which they may trade in the resale market. Nonetheless, I show that the qualitative results of the analysis also hold in an example with downward sloping demand, and they do not require that the resale market is always e¢ cient. I also assume that the number of speculators who participate in the auction is not so large that competition among them always reduces their pro…t to zero and, whenever possible, I focus on the Pareto dominant equilibrium for bidders and speculators.
In this context, the net e¤ect on the seller's revenue of allowing resale and attracting speculators depends on the bidders'relative valuations: if bidders'valuations are relatively similar (i.e., clustered), speculators increase the seller's revenue; if bidders'valuations are instead su¢ ciently di¤erent (i.e., dispersed), speculators reduce the seller's revenue. Suppose that the valuations of bidders who are going to buy in the resale market are not too much higher than the valuations of bidders who are going to sell. After winning an object in the auction, bidders with lower valuations have a higher outside option (relative to the highest valuations) than speculators in the resale market, and hence they obtain a higher pro…t than speculators from reselling. In this case, the presence of speculators induces lower-value bidders to bid more aggressively and there is a strong competitive e¤ect. In contrast, if bidders'valuations are dispersed, all bidders with positive use values reduce demand, because it is now too costly for lower-value bidders to outbid speculators.
In order to increase revenue, the seller should design an auction that induces bidders to compete aggressively. In my model, the seller should allow resale to attract speculators if bidders are relatively symmetric. However, if it is credible, the seller should forbid resale if he knows bidders are asymmetric, even though this excludes speculators and reduces the number of competitors. When bidders are asymmetric, attracting speculators by allowing resale only induces high-value bidders to reduce demand.
The presence of speculators increases the seller's revenue only if speculators are eventually outbid by bidders with positive use values. If bidders accommodate speculators and allow them to win by reducing demand, the seller's revenue is (weakly) reduced. Winning bids by speculators, or resale trade, are bad news for the seller, because they imply that bidders with high use values have allowed speculators to win in order to pay a lower price. 7 However, if the seller cannot prevent resale, the presence of speculators always weakly increases the seller's revenue. If resale is possible, low-value bidders can resell to high-value bidders, and high-value bidders have an incentive to reduce demand and then buy in the resale market even without speculators. In this case, speculators only increase competition in the auction.
Finally, when there is no speculator who may participate in the auction, allowing resale unambiguously facilitates demand reduction, because resale makes it more pro…table for highervalue bidders to reduce demand and less pro…table for other bidders to deviate from a demand reduction equilibrium. Without speculators there is no countervailing e¤ect on the number of players who participate in the auction. In this case, allowing resale reduces the seller's revenue when it induces bidders to reduce demand.
A compelling reason to allow resale after an auction is to obtain an e¢ cient …nal allocation.
But my analysis suggests that a revenue-maximizing seller may want to prevent resale in order to increase the auction price, even if this may reduce e¢ ciency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 de…nes the two types of equilibria that are analyzed. Section 4 discusses bidding strategies and shows that speculators may win an auction against high-value bidders. The e¤ects of resale and speculators on the seller's revenue and the strategies that the seller can adopt to increase his revenue are analyzed in Section 5. Section 5.1 compares an auction with resale and speculators to one in which resale is not allowed and hence speculators do not participate; while Section 5.2 compares an auction with resale and speculators to one in which resale is allowed but speculators are cannot participate. Finally, Section 6 analyzes how resale a¤ects the seller's revenue when there is no speculator, and the last section concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
The Model
Consider a (sealed-bid) uniform-price auction for k units of the same good, that may be followed by a resale market. The reserve price in the auction is normalized to zero. 8 Each player who participates in the auction submits k non-negative bids, one for each of the units. The k highest bids are awarded the units, and the winner(s) pay for each unit won a price equal to the (k + 1) thhighest bid. Uniform-price auctions are often used to allocate multiple identical objects -for example, in on-line IPOs (including the one of Google in August 2004), electricity markets, markets for emission permits, and by the US Treasury Department to issue new securities.
I analyze a uniform-price auction for simplicity, because this is the auction mechanism in which the incentive to reduce demand arises more clearly (Ausubel and Cramton, 1998) . But quota licenses held from 1981 to 1991, the prices at which licenses were traded in the secondary market were 26% higher on average than the auction prices (McAfee, Takacs and Vincent, 1999 additional units are decreasing -as long as the trading procedure in the resale market is known before the auction, so that players know whether they will buy or sell in the resale market, and the price at which they will trade (see the Appendix for an example). 9 Without loss of
There are (k n) male speculators who have no use value for the units on sale. (Speculators can also be interpreted as players whose use value is lower than the opportunity cost to participate in the auction.) Therefore, speculators are willing to participate in the auction only if resale is allowed. The relevant di¤erence between bidders and speculators is that speculators can only obtain a positive pro…t by reselling, while bidders can also obtain a positive pro…t by owning the units on sale; hence, bidders participate in the auction even if resale is not allowed.
The number of speculators can be endogenized by assuming that a speculator pays an entry cost to participate in the auction, and hence he does so if and only if he expects to make positive pro…t. 10 I generically refer to a "player"when I want to indicate either a bidder or a speculator;
player S indicates a speculator and player i indicates bidder B i , i = 1; :::; n.
9 For example, this is the case if trades take place sequentially, starting from the one that generates the largest surplus.
1 0 Speci…cally, suppose speculators arrive sequentially at the auction and observe only the number of players who have entered. A speculator can pay an arbitrarily small cost to learn bidders'use values and enter the auction, or walk away and obtain zero pro…t. Bidding is costless, so a speculator who enters always bids. (See, e.g., Bulow and Klemperer, 2009 .) It follows that a speculator enters the auction if and only if he has some positive probability of winning (before knowing bidders' use values). If more than (k n) speculators have entered, no speculator can obtain positive pro…t (see footnote 18). While if there are no more than (k n) speculators, speculators win the auction and obtain positive pro…t for some bidders'use values (Proposition 1). Therefore, only the …rst (k n) speculators pay the entry cost and participate in the auction.
If instead speculators pay a bidding cost after learning bidders' use values, then they only participate in the auction if they know they are going to win, and speculators cannot increase the seller's revenue (see Section 5). But the main result still holds: allowing resale to attract speculators reduces the seller's revenue when they participate in the auction, because they induce bidders to reduce demand.
I make the following assumption on valuations, which is often used in the literature on demand reduction (e.g., Wilson, 1979) . I make the following assumption on players'sharing of the gains from trade. 1 1 I model the bargaining procedure in the resale market in the simplest possible way. But the results of the analysis are robust to many alternative assumptions about bargaining. For example, if in the resale market the auction winner can threaten to trade with other bidders, then his outside option is higher than his use value, and he obtains a larger share of the gains from trade. So speculators are willing to pay a higher price in the auction. This changes the speci…c equilibrium conditions of Sections 4 and 5, but not their qualitative interpretation, and it actually reinforces the results because it makes demand reduction even more attractive for bidders when resale is allowed. Similarly, if a unit can be traded more than once and there is "multi-parties"bargaining (with alternated o¤ers and a risk of breakdown of negotiation) as in De Meza and Selvaggi (2007) , then in the resale market every player can sell to bidder B1 at price 1 2 (v1 + v2). In this case, demand reduction is always an equilibrium when resale is allowed, and resale and speculators always (weakly) reduce the seller's revenue. Assumption 2. When two players trade a unit in the resale market, they equally share the gains from trade.
Therefore, the outcome of bargaining between two players in the resale market is given by the Nash bargaining solution, where the disagreement point is represented by players' outside options. The resale price at which two players trade is "half way" between the two players'use values.
This assumption is made for simplicity, but all the qualitative results hold for any given sharing of the gains from trade in the resale market (as long as the resale price is higher than the use value of the auction winner and, hence, he obtains some of the gains from trade) and, in particular, even if the auction winner makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er in the resale market, hence obtaining the whole resale surplus. 12 Moreover, giving di¤erent bargaining powers to di¤erent players (e.g., by assuming that speculators can obtain a smaller share of the gains from trade than low-value bidders when trading with bidder B 1 , or vice versa) also does not a¤ect any of the qualitative results.
"Willingness to Pay." When resale is allowed, a player's "willingness to pay" for a unit in the auction -which I de…ne as the highest auction price that a player is happy to pay for a unit -is represented by the price at which he can buy or sell a unit in the resale market (e.g., Milgrom, 1987) .
If a speculator wins a unit in the auction, he resells to bidder B 1 at price 1 2 v 1 ; and if bidder B i , i 6 = 1, wins a unit in the auction, he resells to bidder B 1 at price 1 2 (v 1 + v i ). Therefore, during the auction, the highest price a speculator is happy to pay for one unit is 1 2 v 1 -i.e., the resale price he can obtain in the aftermarket -and the highest price bidder B i , i 6 = 1, is happy to pay for one unit is 1 2 (v 1 + v i ) -i.e., the resale price she can obtain in the aftermarket. And since bidder B 1 can buy a unit in the resale market at a price that is at most equal to 1 2 (v 1 + v 2 ), this is also the highest price she may be happy to pay in the auction.
Hence, taking into account the resale market, bidder B 1 is willing to pay a lower price in the auction because of the possibility of purchasing the units she loses from the auction winners in the aftermarket, while all other bidders and speculators are willing to pay a higher price in the auction because of the possibility of reselling in the aftermarket to bidder B 1 . 13 When resale does not take place, the pro…t of a player who wins the auction is given by the di¤erence between his use value for the unit(s) he acquires and the auction price. When resale takes place, the pro…t of a player who wins the auction and resells is given by the di¤erence between the resale price and the auction price; while the pro…t of a player who buys in the resale market is given by the di¤erence between his use value for the unit(s) he acquires and the resale price. The pro…t of a player who loses the auction and does not trade in the resale market is normalized to zero.
Bidding Strategies. In the auction, a strategy for player i is a k-element vector: (i.e., a player's demand must be non-increasing in price). There is demand reduction if a player's bid is lower than his willingness to pay for a unit. I assume players do not play weakly dominated strategies.
This implies that b j i cannot be higher than the i's willingness to pay for the j th unit. An equilibrium is Pareto dominated by another equilibrium from the players'point of view if in the second equilibrium at least one player is strictly better o¤ and no player is worse o¤ than in the …rst equilibrium.
Assumption 3. Players do not play an equilibrium that is Pareto dominated, from the players' point of view, by another equilibrium (in undominated strategies).
Assumption 3 is used to select among multiple equilibria.
Finally, I also make the following simplifying assumption.
Assumption 4. If two players submit the same bid for a unit, the unit is assigned to the player with the highest use value.
This assumption simpli…es the description of equilibrium strategies but none of the results hinges on it.
De…nition of Equilibria
In a uniform-price auction, it is a weakly dominant strategy for a player to bid his willingness to pay for the …rst unit (see, e.g., Milgrom, 2004) . 14 Moreover, bidding more than your willingness to pay for any unit is also a weakly dominated strategy. But players may …nd it pro…table to 1 4 A player's …rst-unit bid a¤ects the auction price only when it is the (k + 1) th -highest bid, in which case the player wins no unit and the price is irrelevant to him. Therefore, exactly as in a single-unit second-price auction, the …rst-unit bid is chosen to allow the player to win whenever it is pro…table for him to do so -i.e., when his willingness to pay is no lower than the auction price. reduce demand and bid less than their willingness to pay for some units other than the …rst one, in order to pay a lower price for the units they win and so obtain a higher pro…t (Wilson, 1979; Ausubel and Cramton, 1998) . The logic is the same as the standard textbook logic for a monopsonist withholding demand: buying an additional unit increases the price paid for the …rst, inframarginal, units.
I consider two types of equilibria (in undominated strategies) of the auction. In one type of equilibria, which I call Demand Reduction equilibria, speculators win if they participate; in the other type of equilibria, which I call Positive Price equilibria, all speculators and possibly also some of the bidders lose. In order for speculators to win the auction, it is necessary that bidders reduce demand, because bidders have a higher willingness to pay for all units than speculators, and speculators do not bid more than their willingness to pay. De…nition 1. A (zero-price) Demand Reduction (DR) equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the auction in which each player who participates in the auction wins at least one of the units on sale and the auction price is zero.
There can be other equilibria in which each player wins at least one of the units on sale but the auction price is strictly positive. However, any such equilibrium with a positive auction price is Pareto dominated for the players by the zero-price DR equilibrium in which each player wins exactly the same number of units as in the …rst equilibrium (because the …nal allocation is the same in both equilibria but the auction price that players pay is lower in the zero-price DR equilibrium). Moreover, whenever the auction has an equilibrium in which each player wins at least one unit and the auction price is positive, it also has a zero-price DR equilibrium.
De…nition 2. A Positive Price (PP) equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the auction in which the auction price is strictly positive and: (i) if speculators participate in the auction, no speculator wins any unit; (ii) if speculators do not participate in the auction, at least one of the bidders does not win any unit.
There are many possible types of PP equilibria in which speculators lose when they participate in the auction. For example, bidders may outbid speculators and share the units on sale, so that each bidder wins at least one unit. 15 Or some higher-value bidders may outbid all other players (including lower-value bidders) and win all units. Similarly, when speculators do not participate in the auction, there are many possible types of PP equilibria in which some of the bidders lose.
I distinguish between Demand Reduction and Positive Price equilibria in order to analyze when bidders reduce demand and allow speculators to win. In this case, the auction price may be zero, and resale and speculators may reduce the seller's revenue.
Successful Speculators
Assume that resale is allowed and speculators participate in the auction. I consider a zero-price DR equilibrium in which each player bids the highest price he is happy to pay for one unit and zero for all other units. Precisely, bidder B 1 bids:
bidder B i bids:
); i = 2; :::; n;
and each speculator bids:
So each player wins exactly one unit and the seller's revenue is zero. All bidders, apart from
, and all speculators resell the units they buy in the auction to bidder B 1 in the aftermarket.
I investigate under which condition there is a DR equilibrium in which speculators win the auction. 16 De…ne the following (n 1) conditions "Dispersed Top Values" (DTV):
Lemma 1. When resale is allowed and speculators participate, the auction has a (zero-price) DR equilibrium if and only if conditions DTV are satis…ed. Moreover, if conditions DTV are satis…ed, the (zero-price) DR equilibrium is the Pareto dominant equilibrium for players. If instead one or more of conditions DTV is not satis…ed, the auction only has PP equilibria.
As shown in the proof of Lemma 1, if conditions DTV are satis…ed, no players wants to deviate from the DR equilibrium described. In other words, when his competitors reduce demand to one unit, each player prefers to win a single unit in the auction at price zero, rather than try to obtain more units by outbidding his competitors. (And deviating by winning less than one unit is clearly not pro…table.) I now provide intuition for why this is the case.
Bidder B 1 and the speculators have no incentive to deviate from demand reduction. To see this notice that, in order to win more than one unit, a speculator has at least to outbid another speculator. But this raises the auction price to at least 1 2 v 1 , a price at which the speculator can obtain no pro…t. Similarly, if bidder B 1 wins more than one unit in the auction, she only increases the auction price that she pays for the …rst unit (since after reducing demand to one unit, she still buys all other units in the resale market, at the same prices she pays to win them in the auction).
Bidder B 2 is the one who has the strongest incentive to deviate from demand reduction, because she gains the most from outbidding lower-value players and winning more units to resell in the aftermarket. So if bidder B 2 prefers not to deviate from the DR equilibrium, all other lower-value bidders also prefer not to deviate. Bidder B 2 does not deviate if and only if conditions DTV hold. 17 Conditions DTV require that the use values of the two highest-value bidders are su¢ ciently dissimilar or, in other words, that the valuation of the bidder who is going to buy in the resale market is su¢ ciently higher than the valuations of the bidders who are going to sell. For example, all conditions DTV are satis…ed if v 1 > (k 2) v 2 . The reason is that, if bidder B 1 's use value is su¢ ciently higher than bidder B 2 's use value, it is too costly for bidder B 2 to outbid lower-value bidders and/or speculators. Precisely, if v 1 is high, lower-value bidders and speculators can resell at a high price to bidder B 1 , and thus they bid a high price for at least one unit in the auction.
And if v 2 is low, bidder B 2 has a low outside option in the resale market; hence, she can only resell at a relatively low price and she is not willing to pay a high price in the auction.
When conditions DTV are satis…ed, there may also be PP equilibria. However, as shown in the proof of Lemma 1, when a bidder prefers not to deviate from the DR equilibrium, she also obtains a higher pro…t in the DR equilibrium than in any equilibrium with a positive auction price. Therefore, when conditions DTV are satis…ed, the zero-price DR equilibrium is the Pareto-dominant equilibrium for players and, by Assumption 3, players select the zero-price DR equilibrium. When one or more of conditions DTV is not satis…ed, at least one bidder (bidder B 2 ) prefers to outbid the speculators (by bidding at least 1 7 For example, bidder B2 prefers to win one unit at price 0 rather than outbid bidder B3 (together with lower-value bidders and speculators) and win (k 1) units to resell to bidder B1 if and only if
Similarly, bidder B2 prefers to win one unit at price 0 rather than outbid speculators and win (k n + 1) units if and only if Therefore, speculators may successfully participate in the auction, and resell in the aftermarket to the highest-value bidder, thus obtaining a strictly positive pro…t. 18 The speculators' success is due to their ability to exploit in the resale market their superior information compared to the auction seller. In order to obtain the qualitative result of Proposition 1, however, it is only necessary to assume that speculators have enough information to be able to obtain some surplus in the resale market -i.e., that they are able to resell to bidder B 1 at any price di¤erent from zero. It is straightforward to show that the same result holds even if: (i) players have to pay a (not too large) cost to trade in the resale market, or (ii) bidders discount the surplus obtained in the resale market, or (iii) there is a (not too large) probability that resale fails after the auction, so that the resale market is not necessarily e¢ cient. All these assumptions make trading in the resale market less pro…table for players; hence they increase bidder B 1 's willingness to pay in the auction, and reduce all other players' willingness to pay. This may reduce, but does not eliminate, bidders'incentive to accommodate speculators.
As showed in Proposition 1, speculators are not always able to win the auction. The reason is that the presence of speculators in the auction has two contrasting e¤ects for bidders:
(i) Competition E¤ ect: speculators increase the number of competitors in the auction;
(ii) Demand Reduction E¤ ect: resale and speculators a¤ect bidders'incentive to reduce demand.
The demand reduction e¤ect induces bidder B 1 to bid less aggressively and accommodate speculators, because she can always buy in the resale market the units she loses in the auction. Therefore, outbidding speculators has the only e¤ect of increasing the price of the units that bidder B 1 wins in the auction. Moreover, the demand reduction e¤ect may also induce other bidders to bid less aggressively, in order to pay a lower auction price. 19 On the other hand, the competition e¤ect may induce bidders di¤erent from B 1 to bid more aggressively in order to outbid speculators, because these bidders are directly competing with speculators for a chance to resell to bidder B 1 . If these bidders lose a unit in the auction, they have no chance of buying it in the resale market. Speculators win the auction if the demand reduction e¤ect is stronger than the competition e¤ect.
In other words, even when resale is allowed, it is the possibility that bidders reduce demand 1 8 If more than (k n) speculators participate in the auction, competition among speculators drives their pro…t to zero because each speculator bids 1 2 v1 for at least one unit (and bidders bid even higher for at least one unit) and, therefore, the auction price is no lower than 1 2 v1, which is the highest pro…t a speculator can obtain by reselling.
1 9 Bidders have an incentive to reduce demand even without speculators. But allowing resale and attracting speculators in the auction can increase this incentive. See Section 5. that really attracts speculators to the auction. But speculators win the auction only if bidders actually prefer to reduce demand rather than outbid them. 20
Seller' s Revenue
In this section, I analyze how the presence of speculators in an auction a¤ects the seller's revenue.
Notice that the two e¤ects of speculators described in the previous section may a¤ect the seller's revenue in opposite directions: the competition e¤ect tends to increase the seller's revenue, while the demand reduction e¤ect may reduce the seller's revenue.
There are two di¤erent reasons why speculators may not participate in an auction: (i) resale is not allowed, and so speculators have no incentive to participate in the auction, (ii) the seller prevents speculators from participating, even if resale is allowed and so speculators would like to participate in the auction. To analyze the e¤ects of the presence of speculators in each of these cases, I consider the seller's revenue in three di¤erent scenarios:
(1) Resale is allowed and speculators are allowed to participate in the auction.
(2) Resale is not allowed and hence speculators do not participate in the auction. 
Should Resale Be Allowed to Attract Speculators?
Assume that resale is not allowed, so that speculators do not participate in the auction. In this case, we have a standard auction with a …xed number of bidders, 21 and the highest price a bidder is happy to pay in the auction is equal to her use value. De…ne a sharing of the units on sale among bidders as a vector ( 1 ; :::; n ) such that 1 i k n + 1 and Each bidder may have an incentive to deviate from a DR equilibrium, because she may prefer to outbid lower-value bidders and win more units. As shown in the proof of Lemma 2, for a given , conditions CV imply that each bidder B i does not want to deviate from the DR equilibrium with sharing by outbidding a lower-value bidder. 22 Therefore, if conditions CV are satis…ed, each bidder prefers to reduce demand and maintain the auction price at 0 when her competitors also reduce demand, rather than obtain more units by outbidding her competitors.
Conditions CV require that the use values of higher-value bidders are not too much higher than the use values of lower-value bidders. For example, conditions CV are satis…ed for the sharing if and only if (k j + 2) v j > (k j + 1) v 1 , j = 2; : : : ; n; and these conditions are all satis…ed if kv n > (k 1) v 1 . Similarly, for 1 = ::: = n = k n , conditions CV are satis…ed if and only if (n j + 2) v j > (n j + 1) v 1 , j = 2; : : : ; n; and these conditions are all satis…ed if nv n > (n 1) v 1 . The intuition is that, if bidders'use values are su¢ ciently close to each other, lower-value bidders are willing to pay a relatively high price in the auction. Therefore, it is too costly for higher-value bidders to outbid lower-value competitors and bidders prefer to keep the auction price low by reducing demand.
A DR equilibrium with sharing requires more restrictive conditions than any other DR equilibrium, since in a DR equilibrium with sharing the incentive to deviate is stronger (because by outbidding her competitors a bidder can win the highest number of units consistent with a DR equilibrium). So if the auction has a DR equilibrium with sharing , then it also has a DR equilibrium with any other possible sharing. Moreover, because bidder B 1 has a stronger incentive to deviate from a DR equilibrium with sharing than any other lower-value bidder (because she wins the same number of units as all her competitors apart from bidder B n , but she has a higher use value and hence obtains a higher pro…t from winning more units), if it is not pro…table for bidder B 1 to deviate, then it is also not pro…table to deviate for all other bidders.
Finally, as shown in the proof of Lemma 2, the fact that bidders do not want to deviate from a DR equilibrium with sharing also implies that, whenever the auction has another equilibrium with a positive auction price, this equilibrium is Pareto dominated by a DR equilibrium; hence by Assumption 3 it is never chosen by bidders.
Now consider the seller's revenue. Allowing resale increases the maximum price that lowvalue bidders are willing to pay and, by attracting speculators, it increases the number of competitors. These e¤ects tend to increase the seller's revenue. However, as discussed in Section 4, allowing resale also a¤ects bidders'incentive to reduce demand. On the one hand, in a DR equilibrium with speculators bidders can win less units (because speculators have to win too).
This makes demand reduction less attractive. On the other hand, when resale is allowed demand reduction is more attractive for bidder B 1 , because she can buy in the resale market the units she does not win in the auction; and deviating from demand reduction is less attractive for all other bidders, because they have to pay a higher auction price to outbid their competitors. The presence of speculators in the auction is not per se good news for the seller, because speculators may be accommodated by bidders in order to keep the auction price low. It is the fact that speculators participate in the auction but eventually lose that indicates an actual increase in competition, and therefore a higher seller's revenue. 25 In order to compare the seller's revenue with and without resale, I have used Assumption 3 to select among multiple equilibria. Alternatively, without needing to select among equilibria, 2 3 When both conditions DTV and conditions CV (for = and i = 1) are satis…ed, allowing resale and attracting speculators do not a¤ect the seller's revenue, because the auction has a DR equilibrium both with and without resale. When there is no DR equilibrium regardless of whether resale is allowed or not, the e¤ect of allowing resale on the seller's revenue depends on whether resale induces more bidders to reduce demand or to compete more aggressively in a PP equilibrium.
2 4 See the Appendix for more details on this example. 2 5 In my model, speculators never win the auction at a positive price. Speculators may win at a positive price in the presence of uncertainty. For example, in a simultaneous ascending auction bidders may reduce demand only after raising the auction price to test the credibility of speculators. In this case, the seller's revenue may be higher if resale is allowed even when speculators win. However, it remains true that bidders accommodating speculators rather than competing aggressively harms the seller. an equilibrium with resale is lower than the lowest auction price supported in an equilibrium without resale.
Should Speculators Be Allowed to Participate?
Assume now that resale is allowed but that the seller prevents speculators from participating in the auction. In this case, the highest price a bidder is happy to pay in the auction is equal to the price at which she can trade in the resale market.
Consider a zero-price DR equilibrium with sharing , in which each bidder B i bids a positive price for i units and zero for all other units. Precisely, bidder B 1 bids:
and bidder B i bids: In this equilibrium, bidder B i wins i units, i = 1; :::; n, and the seller's revenue is zero. All bidders, apart from B 1 , resell the units they win to bidder B 1 .
I investigate under which condition the auction has a DR equilibrium, and therefore the seller can obtain no revenue. De…ne the following conditions "Dispersed Top Values or Clustered
Bottom Values" (DCV):
: : : ; n 1; j = i + 1; : : : ; n: (DCV)
Lemma 3. When resale is allowed but speculators cannot participate, the auction has a (zeroprice) DR equilibrium with sharing if and only if conditions DCV are satis…ed. Moreover, if conditions DCV are satis…ed for the sharing and i = 2, then they are also satis…ed for every sharing and every i, and any equilibrium with a positive auction price is Pareto dominated, from the bidders'point of view, by a (zero-price) DR equilibrium. If instead there is no such that conditions DCV are satis…ed, the auction only has PP equilibria.
As shown in the proof of Lemma 3, if conditions DCV are satis…ed, no players wants to deviate from the DR equilibrium described. Proposition 3. If resale cannot be prevented, the presence of speculators in the auction (weakly) increases the seller's revenue.
As shown in the proof of Proposition 3, when resale is allowed, if the auction has a Pareto dominant (zero-price) DR equilibrium with speculators, then it also has a Pareto dominant (zero-price) DR equilibrium without speculators. 27 Therefore, the presence of speculators never reduces the seller's revenue. Moreover, the presence of speculators strictly increases the seller's revenue when the auction has a Pareto dominant (zero-price) DR equilibrium without speculators, but it only has equilibria with positive prices with speculators.
The intuition for this result is that, if resale is possible, bidders have a stronger incentive to reduce demand when speculators do not participate in the auction. Bidder B 1 has an incentive to reduce demand even without speculators, because any bidder who wins a unit resells it to bidder B 1 . Without speculators, lower-value bidders have a stronger incentive to reduce demand, because they can win more units in a DR equilibrium and, even if they win the same number of units, they pay a (weakly) higher price. Hence, in contrast to the case in which the seller can prevent resale, if resale is always possible demand reduction cannot possibly be easier when speculators participate in the auction, and speculators only increase competition in the auction.
Seller' s Strategy
Consider a seller who is committed to run a uniform price auction. 28 The results of the last two Therefore, knowing bidders'relative valuations and being able to prevent resale can help the seller to increase his revenue. By contrast, being able to distinguish speculators from bidders is not useful for the seller, because excluding speculators from the auction can increase the seller's revenue only if it is achieved through forbidding resale. And if the seller wants to induce enough speculators to participate, he can simply allow resale and not restrict entry in the auction.
2 7 I show this by proving that if conditions DTV (the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a DR equilibrium when speculators participate in the auction) are satis…ed, then conditions DCV (the su¢ cient conditions for a DR equilibrium when resale is allowed but speculators do not participate in the auction) are also satis…ed, for every possible sharing of the units, but the converse is not true.
2 8 This is not an optimal selling mechanism, neither with resale nor without resale (see Maskin and Riley, 1989) . When bidders have ‡at demand, but not when they have downward sloping demand, the seller maximizes his revenue by bundling the units on sale (see also Pagnozzi, 2009) or by selling them sequentially, because both these mechanisms eliminate demand reduction. However, in actual practice, sellers are often unable or unwilling to bundle multiple units -perhaps because they are unsure of the number of units that each bidder is willing to acquire -or sell them sequentially -perhaps for fear of selling identical units at di¤erent prices to di¤erent bidders.
In the model, when resale is allowed the …nal allocation of the units is always e¢ cient, even if bidders reduce demand during the auction (and so the allocation at the end of the auction is not e¢ cient). But if the seller prevents resale to increase his revenue, the highest-value bidder may still prefer to reduce demand and let other bidders win, in which case the …nal allocation of the units is ine¢ cient. So the seller may face a trade-o¤ between increasing revenue and maximizing e¢ ciency.
However, if the resale market is not necessarily e¢ cient -because, for example, bidders may not be able to exploit pro…table trade opportunities after the auction -allowing resale may actually reduce e¢ ciency and result in an ine¢ cient …nal allocation of the units on sale. The reason is that resale may still induce high-value bidders to reduce demand during the auction, only then to …nd themselves unable to trade with low-value bidders and/or speculators in the aftermarket. 30 The seller may also want to impose a higher reserve price in order to make demand reduction less attractive for bidders. While it is typically argued that a reserve price reduces e¢ ciency because it may lead to no sale, in my model a higher reserve price can increase the e¢ ciency of the initial allocation achieved by the auction, because it can eliminate a DR equilibrium and crowd out speculators if resale is allowed. Moreover, if resale is not allowed, a reserve price that eliminates a DR equilibrium also increases the e¢ ciency of the …nal allocation of the units on sale.
Resale without Speculators
What is the e¤ect on the seller's revenue of allowing resale, when the number of competitors in the auction is …xed and there is no speculator who is willing to participate in the auction? To answer this question, I compare an auction with n bidders and no speculator in which resale is not allowed, to an auction with the same number of bidders and no speculator in which resale is allowed. (So I basically compare the second and third scenarios of Section 5.)
The e¤ect on the seller's revenue of allowing resale depends on whether it induces bidders to reduce demand (compared to an auction without resale) or it induces bidders to bid more aggressively when they do not reduce demand. players are unable to trade in the resale market. Then it can be shown that, if 10v2 > v1 > 3v2, the auction has a demand reduction equilibrium if resale is allowed, but not if resale is not allowed. In this case, allowing resale generates an ine¢ cient allocation of the units on sale with probability . (This point is further discussed in Pagnozzi, 2009.) equilibrium with resale, but it only has PP equilibria without resale. Therefore, allowing resale reduces the seller's revenue.
(ii) If bidder B 2 outbids all other lower-value bidders when resale is allowed and, for every sharing , one or more of conditions DCV is not satis…ed, then the auction price in all equilibria with resale is higher then the auction price in any Pareto undominated equilibrium without resale. Therefore, allowing resale increases the seller's revenue.
Recall from Section 5.1 that, without resale, there is no DR equilibrium if bidders are asymmetric -i.e., if bidder B 1 's use value is much higher than the other bidders' use valuesbecause in this case bidder B 1 prefers to win more units in the auction. But resale makes bidders'willingness to pay in the auction closer to each other, because bidder B 1 is willing to pay a price lower than her use value due to the option to buy in the resale market, while all other bidders are willing to pay a price higher than their use values due to the option to sell in the resale market. This unambiguously makes demand reduction more attractive for bidders. 31 Speci…cally, allowing resale makes it more likely that the auction has a DR equilibrium, because, as with speculators, resale makes it more pro…table for bidder B 1 to reduce demand and more costly for other bidders to deviate from a DR equilibrium and, without speculators, it has no countervailing e¤ect on the number of competitors in the auction (which could otherwise make demand reduction less pro…table). Resale reduces the seller's revenue if bidders choose a DR equilibrium when resale is allowed.
However, allowing resale also increases the highest prices that all bidders, apart from B 1 , are willing to pay for the …rst unit in the auction. When bidders never choose a DR equilibriumi.e., when there are only PP equilibria both when resale is allowed and when resale is not allowed -resale induces bidders to bid more aggressively for at least some units and may increase the seller's revenue (even though resale still makes it relatively more pro…table for bidders to reduce demand). For example, allowing resale increases the seller's revenue when conditions DCV are not satis…ed and bidder B 2 prefers to outbid all her lower-value competitors rather than reduce demand when resale is allowed.
Allowing resale ensures an e¢ cient …nal allocation of the units on sale. By contrast, if resale is not allowed and bidders reduce demand, the …nal allocation of the units is ine¢ cient. Therefore, as when there are speculators who may participate in the auction, in choosing whether to allow resale the seller may face a trade-o¤ between increasing revenue and maximizing e¢ ciency.
Conclusions
Although speculators are attracted by the possibility of resale, in single-object auctions it is unclear why high-value bidders should let speculators win and then buy in the resale market, rather than simply outbid speculators during the auction.
By analyzing a simple model of a uniform-price auction with complete information, I have made three main points. Firstly, I have shown that high-value bidders may strictly prefer to let speculators win when multiple objects are on sale, in order to keep the price low and acquire some of the objects more cheaply in the auction.
Secondly, it is not true that the only e¤ect of allowing resale is to increase competition in the auction by attracting speculators. I have shown that, when bidders'valuations are dispersed, the possibility of resale induces an accommodating strategy by high-value bidders; hence allowing resale reduces the seller's revenue even though it attracts speculators. In fact, when high-value bidders allow speculators to win the auction, they do so to avoid raising the auction price. So resale and speculators increase the seller's revenue only if their e¤ect on competition is stronger than their e¤ect on bidders'incentives to reduce demand.
Thirdly, when it does not attract speculators, it is even more likely that resale reduces the seller's revenue in multi-object auctions, because allowing resale increases the incentive for all bidders to reduce demand, and without speculators it has no countervailing e¤ect on the number of competitors in the auction.
It is often argued that resale after an auction should never be forbidden because, by allowing bidders to exploit gains from trade in the aftermarket, resale ensures an e¢ cient …nal allocation of the units on sale. 32 But my analysis shows that the possibility of resale, through its e¤ect on bidding strategies during the auction, may yield a lower revenue for the seller, even when additional bidders participate in the auction when resale is allowed. Therefore, when bidders' valuations are dispersed, a revenue-maximizing seller should commit to prevent resale, even though this may reduce e¢ ciency.
A. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. It is a weakly dominant strategy for bidder B i , i 6 = 1, to bid 1 2 (v 1 + v i ) for the …rst unit, and for each speculator to bid 1 2 v 1 for the …rst unit. For bidder B 1 , any bid for the …rst unit higher than 1 2 (v 1 + v i ) -the highest price she can pay in the resale market -or lower than 1 2 (v 1 + v i ) -the lowest price she can pay in the resale market -is weakly dominated.
Let i denote the pro…t that player i obtains in equilibrium. In a DR equilibrium, each player wins one unit in the auction at price zero. Therefore, each speculator obtains a pro…t equal to the price at which he resells in the aftermarket -i.e.:
bidder B i , i 6 = 1, obtains a pro…t equal to the price at which she resells in the aftermarketi.e.: i = 1 2 (v 1 + v i ) ; i = 2; :::; n; and bidder B 1 obtains a pro…t equal to the di¤erence between her valuation for the k units, and the price she has to pay to acquire (k 1) units in the aftermarket ((n 1) units from other bidders and (k n) units from speculators) -i.e.:
First notice that no player has an incentive to deviate from a (zero-price) DR equilibrium by winning less units, because this does not a¤ect the auction price, and hence can only reduce the player's pro…t. And speculators have no incentive to deviate from a DR equilibrium at all because, in order to win more than one unit, a speculator has to raise the auction price at least up to 1 2 v 1 , in which case he obtains no pro…t. Similarly, bidder B 1 has no incentive to deviate from a DR equilibrium because, after reducing demand, bidder B 1 still buys in the resale market all the units she does not win in the auction, at the same price she would have to pay to win them in the auction. So the only e¤ect of winning more than one unit in the auction when other players reduce demand is to increase the auction price that bidder B 1 pays for the …rst unit she wins.
By contrast, other bidders may want to deviate from the DR equilibrium described (in which bidder B 1 bids 1 2 (v 1 + v 2 ) for the …rst unit) and outbid lower-value bidders and/or speculators. (It is clearly never pro…table for a bidder to outbid the …rst-unit bid of a competitor with a higher value.) Consider bidder B 2 . If bidder B 2 outbids speculators, she outbids all of them. By Assumption 4, bidder B 2 can outbid all speculators by bidding 1 2 v 1 for (k n + 1) units. In this case, she wins (k n + 1) units in the auction that she can resell at price 1 2 (v 1 + v 2 ) to bidder B 1 in the aftermarket. This deviation is not pro…table if and only if:
Bidder B 2 may also want to outbid lower-value bidders. If it is pro…table for bidder B 2 to outbid bidder B j , j 3, then it is also pro…table to outbid all other bidders with a use value lower than v j . Indeed, by Assumption 4, by bidding 1 2 (v 1 + v j ) for (k j + 2) units and a lower price for all other units, bidder B 2 outbids bidders B j ,..., B n (in addition to all speculators) and wins (k j + 2) units in the auction that she can resell to bidder B 1 in the aftermarket. This deviation is not pro…table if and only if, for j = 3; :::; n:
Summing up conditions A.1 and A.2, bidder B 2 does not want to deviate from the DR equilibrium described if and only if the following (n 1) conditions are satis…ed:
. . .
If bidder B 2 does not want to deviate from the DR equilibrium, then no other lower-value bidder wants to deviate either. To see this, consider bidder B i , i 6 = 1; 2. Bidder B i prefers to reduce demand and win one unit at price 0 rather than outbid bidder B j , j > i, and win (k j + 1) units if and only if:
Clearly, this condition is implied by A.2, the condition for bidder B 2 not wanting to outbid bidder B j . Similarly, the condition for bidder B i not wanting to deviate from the DR equilibrium by outbidding speculators is implied by condition A.1.
Notice that there may be other (zero-price) DR equilibria in undominated strategies that are identical to the one described, except that bidder
for the …rst unit. However, these equilibria require conditions that are more restrictive than conditions DTV, because at least one bidder B i , i 6 = 1, has a stronger incentive to deviate from demand reduction when bidder B 1 bids less than 1 2 (v 1 + v 2 ) for the …rst unit, since she can also obtain positive pro…t by outbidding bidder B 1 . Therefore, whenever the auction has a (zero-price) DR equilibrium in which bidder B 1 bids less than 1 2 (v 1 + v 2 ) for the …rst unit, it also has a (zero-price) DR equilibrium in which bidder B 1 bids 1 2 (v 1 + v 2 ) for the …rst unit.
In conclusion, if and only if conditions DTV are satis…ed, all players prefer to reduce demand and win one unit at price zero when their opponents are reducing demand to one unit, rather then deviate and win more units. Hence, there is a zero-price DR equilibrium.
When conditions DTV are satis…ed, there may be other equilibria with demand reduction in which each player wins one unit but the auction price is strictly positive. 33 However, these equilibria are Pareto dominated for all players by the zero-price DR equilibrium, because the …nal allocation is the same in all these equilibria and only the auction price that players pay is di¤erent. Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that equilibria with demand reduction and a strictly positive auction price require conditions that are more restrictive than conditions DTV. Therefore, whenever the auction has an equilibrium with demand reduction and a strictly positive price, it also has a zero-price DR equilibrium.
When conditions DTV are satis…ed, there may also be PP equilibria. However, these equilibria are Pareto dominated for all players by the zero-price DR equilibrium. To see this, notice that in a PP equilibrium the auction price is at least 1 2 v 1 if only speculators lose, and is at least 1 2 (v 1 + v i ) if bidder B i loses. But, when conditions DTV are satis…ed, each bidder prefers to win one unit at price zero, rather than win more units by outbidding speculators and paying a price equal to 1 2 v 1 or by outbidding a lower-value bidder and paying a price equal to her willingness to pay. Therefore, each bidder obtains a strictly higher pro…t in a DR equilibrium than in a PP equilibrium. And, clearly, also speculators are strictly better o¤ in a DR equilibrium.
When one or more of conditions DTV is not satis…ed, at least one bidder wants to outbid all speculators, even if all other players reduce demand. So speculators cannot win the auction. And in order to outbid speculators, this bidder has to raise the auction price at least up to Proof of Proposition 1. The "if" part of the statement follows from Lemma 1. The "only if" part follows because, in order for all speculators to win in equilibrium, each bidder must prefer to reduce demand and bid less than Proof of Lemma 2. In the zero-price DR equilibrium with sharing that we have considered (in which each bidder bids her use value for the units she wins), bidder B i wins i units at price zero, where 1 i k n + 1 and P n i=1 i = k, and obtains a pro…t equal to:
This is indeed an equilibrium if and only if no bidder prefers to deviate, outbid her competitors, and win more units. First notice that it is never pro…table for a bidder to outbid a higher-value competitor. Moreover, if for a bidder B i it is pro…table to outbid a bidder B j , j > i, then it is also pro…table to outbid all other bidders with a use value lower than v j . Bidder B i , i = 1; :::; n 1, prefers to win i units at price 0, rather than outbid bidders B j ,...,B n , for j = i + 1; :::; n, and win ( i + j + j+1 + ::: + n ) units by bidding at least v j for those units, if and only if:
Therefore, for a given sharing , if and only if conditions CV are satis…ed for every i 6 = n and j > i, each bidder B i prefers to reduce demand to i units and bid zero for all other units when her competitors reduce demand according to the sharing (i.e., when each competitor B j bids v j for j units and 0 for all other units), rather then deviate and outbid any other bidder to win more units. In this case, the auction has a zero-price DR equilibrium sharing . 34 There may be other equilibria (in undominated strategies) that are exactly equivalent to the zero-price DR equilibrium with sharing that we consider. Speci…cally there may be a zeroprice DR equilibrium with sharing in which each bidder B i bids v i for the …rst unit and any price b j i such that v i+1 b j i v i , j = 2; :::; i , for the other i 1 units that she wins. But the conditions that have to be satis…ed for these strategies to be an equilibrium are more restrictive than the conditions for the zero-price DR equilibrium that we consider (in which bidders bid their use values for all the units they wins), because deviating by outbidding lower-value bidders is less costly if those bidders bid less than their valuation for some units. This proves the …rst part of the statement.
To prove the second part of the statement, I proceed as follows. (1 + :::
This implies that bidder B 1 does not want to deviate from a zero-price DR equilibrium with sharing , because she prefers to win 1 unit at price 0, rather than outbid any bidder B j and win (k j + 2) units at price v j . The inequalities A.3 clearly imply that, for i > 1:
In other words, if bidder B 1 does not want to deviate from a DR equilibrium with sharing , then no other bidder wants to deviate either. Therefore, the auction has a zero-price DR equilibrium with sharing if and only if conditions CV are satis…ed for = and i = 1. (2) Conditions CV for a DR equilibrium with sharing can be written as:
:::; n 1; j = i + 1; :::; n: (A.4)
Because i 1, (v j v i ) < 0, and ( j + j+1 + ::: + n ) (k n + 1) (since in any sharing bidders B 1 ; :::; B j 1 have to win at least one unit each), the inequalities A.4 imply that:
: : : ; n 1; j = i + 1; : : : ; n:
These last inequalities represent conditions CV for a DR equilibrium with sharing . Therefore, if the auction has a zero-price DR equilibrium with sharing , then it also has a zero-price DR equilibrium with any possible sharing .
(3) Suppose the auction has a zero-price DR equilibrium with sharing . Clearly, a DR equilibrium in which each bidder wins at least one unit and the auction price is strictly positive is Pareto dominated for all bidders by the zero-price DR equilibrium in which each bidder wins the same number of units but the auction price is equal to 0.
But the auction may also have PP equilibria in which some bidders do not win any unit and the auction price is positive. However, in a PP equilibrium the auction price is at least equal to the valuation of the highest-value bidder who loses the auction, because that bidder bids her valuation for the …rst unit. Moreover, if bidder B j does not win any unit in a PP equilibrium, then no bidder with a lower use value than bidder B j wins any unit either. The reason is that, if bidder B j does not win any unit, the auction price is v j ; hence higher than the valuation of any bidder B l such that l > j.
So consider a generic PP equilibrium in which bidders B j ; :::; B n do not win any unit (j 2) and the other j 1 bidders win at least one unit each. Speci…cally, let i be the number of units won by bidder B i , i = 1; :::; j 1. Notice that 1 i k j + 2. In this equilibrium the auction price must be v j . But if conditions CV are satis…ed for sharing , bidder B i , i = 1; :::; j 1, prefers to win 1 unit at price 0, rather than (k j + 2) units at price v j . So each bidder B i obtains a strictly higher pro…t in the DR equilibrium with sharing than in any PP equilibrium. (And, clearly, bidders who do not win any unit in a PP equilibrium also obtain a strictly higher pro…t in the DR equilibrium with sharing .) Summing up, when the auction has a zero-price DR equilibrium with sharing , all other equilibria with a positive auction price are Pareto dominated, from the bidders'point of view, by the zero-price DR equilibrium with sharing . Finally, the last part of the statement follows because, when there is no sharing such that all conditions CV are satis…ed, at least one bidder prefers to outbid a lower-value competitor and raise the auction price in order to win more units, when all other bidders reduce demand according to any sharing . Therefore the auction has no zero-price DR equilibrium and there are only PP equilibria in which some bidders do not win any unit and the auction price is strictly positive.
Proof of Proposition 2. First notice that conditions DTV and conditions CV are not necessarily mutually exclusive -i.e., the two sets of conditions are not disjoint and may be satis…ed together. 35 Moreover, none of the two sets of conditions implies the other; 36 and conditions in both sets may simultaneously not be satis…ed. Whether resale reduces or increases the seller's revenue depends on whether demand reduction is an equilibrium when resale is allowed.
If conditions DTV are satis…ed and, 8 , one or more of conditions CV is not satis…ed, the auction has a unique Pareto dominant zero-price DR equilibrium if and only if resale is allowed. Therefore, allowing resale induces bidders to choose a DR equilibrium and strictly reduces the seller's revenue. This proves part (i) of the statement.
If one or more of conditions DTV is not satis…ed and conditions CV are satis…ed for = and i = 1, the auction has a unique Pareto dominant zero-price DR equilibrium if and only if resale is not allowed. Therefore, allowing resale induces bidders to choose an equilibrium with a positive auction price and increases the seller's revenue. This proves part (ii) of the statement.
If both conditions DTV and conditions CV are satis…ed for = and i = 1, there is a Pareto dominant zero-price DR equilibrium both with and without resale. Therefore, allowing resale has no e¤ect on the seller's revenue.
Finally, suppose that one or more of conditions DTV is not satis…ed and, for at least one , one or more of conditions CV is not satis…ed either. Hence, when resale is allowed the auction only has PP equilibria. By contrast, when resale is not allowed the auction may have both PP equilibria and DR equilibria, but the latter do not necessarily Pareto dominate the former; hence they are not necessarily played by bidders. In this case, allowing resale induces all bidders apart from bidder B 1 to bid more aggressively for the …rst unit than when resale is not allowed, because of the possibility of reselling to bidder B 1 , and induces some bidders (but not bidder B 1 ) to also bid aggressively for more than one unit, in order to outbid speculators and other lower-value bidders. This tends to increase the seller's revenue. However, allowing resale also a¤ects bidders incentive to reduce demand, and there may be a PP equilibrium in which bidders reduce demand, even if they outbid all speculators. This may reduce the seller's revenue when bidders do not play a DR equilibrium, if one exists, when resale is not allowed. So a PP equilibrium when resale is allowed may have both a higher price and a lower price then a PP equilibrium when resale is not allowed. In this case, the e¤ect of allowing resale on the seller's revenue is more ambiguous and depends on whether resale induces more higher-value bidders to reduce demand or to bid more aggressively to beat their competitors, compared to an auction without resale.
Nonetheless, in order for resale to strictly increase the seller's revenue, it is necessary that the auction has no Pareto dominant (zero-price) DR equilibrium when resale is allowed; hence that one or more of conditions DTV is not satis…ed. (Otherwise, the seller's revenue is equal to zero when resale is allowed.) This proves part (iii) of the statement.
Analysis of Example 1. When resale is allowed, by Lemma 1 the auction has a Paretodominant zero-price DR equilibrium, and hence the seller's revenue is equal to 0, if and only if v 1 > 2v 2 . Otherwise, the auction only has PP equilibria. When resale is not allowed, by Lemma 2: (i) the auction has a zero-price DR equilibrium with sharing 0 = (3; 1) if and only if v 1 < 4v 2 ; (ii) the auction has a zero-price DR equilibrium with sharing 00 = (2; 2) if and only if v 1 < 2v 2 ; (iii) the auction has a zero-price DR equilibrium with sharing 000 = (1; 3) if and only if v 1 < 4 3 v 2 . The auction may also have equilibria with a positive auction price. But if there is a DR equilibrium with a positive auction price and sharing 0 , 00 or 000 , then there is also a zero-price DR equilibrium with the same sharing, and the former equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the latter. Finally, the auction may have a PP equilibrium in which bidder B 1 wins all 4 units and the auction price is v 2 . But this equilibrium is Pareto dominated by a zero-price DR equilibrium with sharing 0 = (3; 1) when the latter equilibrium exists (because in this case bidder B 1 obtains a strictly higher pro…t by winning 3 units at price 0, rather than 4 units at price v 2 ). Summing up, when resale is not allowed, if and only if v 1 < 4v 2 the auction has a zero-price DR equilibrium and, even if it also has an equilibrium with a positive auction price, this equilibrium is Pareto dominated by a zero-price DR equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 3. In a zero-price DR equilibrium with sharing , bidder B i , i = 1; :::n, wins i units in the auction at price zero, where 1 i k n + 1 and P n i=1 i = k. Each bidder i 6 = 1 resells to bidder B 1 and obtains a pro…t equal to the resale price for i units -i.e.: While bidder B 1 obtains a pro…t equal to the di¤erence between her valuation for the k units, and the price she has to pay to acquire (k 1 ) units in the resale market -i.e.:
First notice that bidder B 1 has no incentive to deviate from the DR equilibrium that we have considered (in which each bidder bids the same price for all the units she wins), because the only e¤ect of outbidding a lower-value competitor and winning more units in the auction is to increase the auction price that bidder B 1 pays for the 1 units she wins in the DR equilibrium. Bidder B n has no incentive to deviate from a DR equilibrium either, because to outbid a higher-value competitor she has to pay more than her willingness to pay. Now consider bidder B i , i = 2; :::; n 1. Clearly, it is never pro…table for bidder B i to outbid a higher-value bidder. Moreover, bidder B i prefers to win i units at price 0 rather than outbid bidders B j ; :::; B n , for j = i + 1; :::; n, and win ( i + j + j+1 + ::: + n ) units if and only if:
So bidder B i does not deviate from the DR equilibrium with sharing if and only if the following (n i) conditions are satis…ed:
And if and only if these conditions are satis…ed for every i 6 = 1; n, all bidders prefer to reduce demand when their opponents reduce demand, rather then deviate and outbid any other bidder to win more units.
Of course, there may be other equilibria in undominated strategies that are exactly equivalent to the zero-price DR equilibrium with sharing that we consider, and in which each bidder B i bids less than 1 2 (v 1 + v i ) for some of the units she wins. But the conditions that have to be satis…ed for these strategies to be an equilibrium are more restrictive than the conditions for the zero-price DR equilibrium that we consider, because deviating by outbidding lower-value bidders is less costly if those bidders bid less than their willingness to pay.
By the argument in the proof of the second part of Lemma 2, when conditions DCV are satis…ed for = and i = 2, conditions DCV are also satis…ed for every sharing and every i (because when resale is allowed bidder B 2 has a stronger incentive to deviate from a DR equilibrium than any other bidder, and her incentive to deviate is stronger from a DR equilibrium with sharing , than from any other DR equilibrium, since by outbidding her competitors bidder B 2 can win the highest number of units consistent with a DR equilibrium). And when conditions DCV are satis…ed for every sharing , all other equilibria with a positive auction price are Pareto dominated, from the bidders' point of view, by a zero-price DR equilibrium (because each bidder prefers to win even only one unit at price 0, rather than more units at the price that is necessary to outbid her competitors). Finally, when there is no sharing such that conditions DCV are satis…ed, at least one bidder prefers to outbid a lower-value competitor when all other bidders reduce demand according to any sharing . Therefore the auction has only PP equilibria and no zero-price DR equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3. I am going to show that, if conditions DTV are satis…ed, then conditions DCV are also satis…ed for every , but the converse is not true. In other words, it is easier to have a Pareto dominant DR equilibrium without speculators than with speculators; hence speculators cannot reduce the seller's revenue by inducing bidders to reduce demand. To see this, notice that the …rst (n 2) conditions DTV can be written as:
And because (k j + 1) k ( 1 + ::: + j 1 ) ( j + ::: + n ) and v 2 > v i for i > 2, if the inequalities A.5 are satis…ed, then the following inequalities are also satis…ed:
Finally, because i 1, if the inequalities A.6 are satis…ed, then the following inequalities are also satis…ed:
These last inequalities represent conditions DCV. Moreover, conditions DTV may not be satis…ed even if conditions DCV are satis…ed for every , because conditions DTV also require that v 1 > (k n) v 2 and, regardless of , this is not implied by conditions DCV. Therefore, when resale is allowed, if there is a Pareto dominant zero-price DR equilibrium when speculators participate in the auction, there are also DR equilibria with every sharing when speculators do not participate in the auction, and other equilibria with positive prices are Pareto dominated by a DR equilibrium. But the converse is not true. So the presence of speculators eliminates a DR equilibrium and increases the seller's revenue when conditions DCV are satis…ed for every and one or more of conditions DTV is not satis…ed.
Finally, if there is no DR equilibrium when speculators participate in the auction, the presence of speculators can never reduce the seller's revenue because, in this case, speculators increase the number of competitors in the auction and can only induce bidders to bid more aggressively to outbid speculators, thus raising the auction price.
Proof of Proposition 4. Conditions CV are more restrictive than conditions DCV. Indeed, for any given sharing , conditions CV imply conditions DCV, but the converse is not true:
Hence, without speculators, if there is a Pareto dominant DR equilibrium when resale is not allowed, there is also a Pareto dominant DR equilibrium when resale is allowed. So the possibility of resale facilitates demand reduction and, therefore, it may reduce the seller's revenue. This happens when conditions DCV are satis…ed for = and i = 1, so that there is a Pareto dominant zero-price DR equilibrium with resale, and for every sharing one or more of conditions CV is not satis…ed, so that there is no zero-price DR equilibrium without resale. This proves part (i) of the statement.
On the other hand, if both conditions DCV and conditions CV are satis…ed for = and i = 1, resale does not a¤ect the seller's revenue, because there is a Pareto dominant zero-price DR equilibrium both with and without resale.
If for every one or more of conditions DCV is not satis…ed, there is no DR equilibrium when resale is allowed. And since one or more of conditions CV is not satis…ed either, there is also no DR equilibrium when resale is not allowed. So the auction price is positive both with resale and without resale. But when resale is allowed all bidders apart from bidder B 1 bid more aggressively for the …rst unit than when resale is not allowed, because of the option to resell. This tends to increase the seller's revenue. However, allowing resale also a¤ects bidders incentive to reduce demand in a PP equilibrium, even if the auction price is positive. Therefore, the e¤ect of allowing resale on the auction price is more ambiguous.
But suppose that bidder B 2 outbids all other lower-value bidders when resale is allowed. Then in any PP equilibrium the auction price p is 1 2 (v 1 + v 3 ). By contrast, when resale is not allowed, there can be a PP equilibrium with an auction price at most equal to v 2 , which is bidder B 2 's bid for the …rst unit. Notice that there is no PP equilibrium with a price > v 3 and < v 2 that is not Pareto dominated (by a PP equilibrium with the same allocation and price v 3 ). Hence, if without resale the auction price is lower than v 2 , allowing resale increases the seller's revenue. So suppose that there is a PP equilibrium in which bidder B 1 wins all units and the auction price is equal to v 2 , which may be higher than p . (This is the only case in which the price is equal to v 2 in an equilibrium that is not Pareto dominated.) Then it is at least necessary that bidder B 1 prefers to outbid all other bidders and win n units at price v 2 , rather than win (n 1) units only at price v 3 . Otherwise, by Assumption 3, an equilibrium in which bidder B 1 wins all units and the auction price is v 2 would not be played because it would be Pareto dominated by an equilibrium in which bidder B 1 reduces demand and wins (n 1) units, bidder B 2 wins 1 unit, and the auction price is v 3 . Therefore, in order for the auction price to be equal to v 2 when resale is not allowed it is necessary that: n (v 1 v 2 ) > (n 1) (v 1 v 3 ) , v 1 + (n 1) v 3 > nv 2 :
(A.7)
And rearranging inequality A.7:
Hence, in any equilibrium that is not Pareto dominated without resale, the auction price is lower than p , which is the auction price when resale is allowed and bidder B 2 outbids all other lower-value bidders. This proves part (ii) of the statement.
An Example with Downward Sloping Demand. Suppose that n = 3 and k = 5 -i.e., there are 3 bidders, 2 speculator and 5 units on sale -and that bidders demand at most 4 units. Speci…cally, each bidder B i , i = 1; 2; 3, has a use value equal to v i for the …rst 4 units, and 0 for the …fth unit. I assume that, if resale is allowed, trades in the aftermarket take place sequentially, starting from the one that generates the largest surplus -i.e., …rst the bidder who has the highest use value among those who are going to buy in the resale market trades with the player who has the lowest use value among those who are going to sell, then the bidder who has the second-highest use value trades with the player who has the second-lowest use value, and so on. (This procedure ensures that, given a …xed sharing of the gains from trade, with each trade the bidder who has the highest use value for one of the units that remain to be traded obtains the largest possible surplus.) Therefore, if the two speculators and bidders B 2 and B 3 win one unit each, only the speculators and bidder B 3 resell to bidder B 1 , at price 1 2 v 1 and 1 2 (v 1 + v 3 ) respectively. Assume that resale is allowed and consider a zero-price DR equilibrium in which each player bids a positive price for the …rst unit on sale, and 0 for all other units. Speci…cally, the speculators bids 1 2 v 1 for the …rst unit and bidder B 3 bids 1 2 (v 1 + v 3 ) for the …rst unit, since these are the prices at which they can sell to bidder B 1 in the resale market. Notice that, for the usual reasons, neither the speculators nor bidder B 1 wants to deviate from the DR equilibrium. By contrast, bidders B 2 and B 3 may want to outbid the speculator and/or a lower-value bidder in order to win more units.
Bidders B 2 does not want to deviate from the DR equilibrium by outbidding the speculators if and only if she obtains a higher pro…t by winning one unit at price 0, rather than by raising the price up to 1 2 v 1 and winning 2 more units to resell to bidder B 1 -i.e.:
(A.8)
Clearly, if condition A.8 is satis…ed, then bidder B 3 does not want to deviate from the DR equilibrium by outbidding the speculators either. Moreover, bidder B 2 does not want to deviate from the DR equilibrium by outbidding bidder B 3 (and the speculators) if and only if she obtains a higher pro…t by winning one unit at price 0, rather than by winning 4 units at price Therefore, if and only if both conditions A.8 and A.9 are satis…ed, the auction has a zero-price DR equilibrium when resale is allowed and speculators win. These conditions are analogous to the ones of Lemma 1. Assume now that resale is not allowed and hence speculators do not participate in the auction. The auction has a zero-price DR equilibrium with sharing ( 1 ; 2 ; 3 ) such that i 1 and 1 + 2 + 3 = 5 (in which each bidder bids her use value for the units she wins), if and only if each bidder B i obtains a higher pro…t by winning i units at price 0 than by outbidding her lower-value competitors -i.e.: 37 8 < :
(A.10)
By the argument of Lemma 2, if conditions A.10 are satis…ed for the sharing (1; 1; 3) -i.e., if 4v 3 > 3v 1 -then they are also satis…ed for any other sharing , and any equilibrium with a positive auction price is Pareto dominated by a zero-price DR equilibrium.
Summing up, if for every sharing one or more of conditions A.10 is not satis…ed and conditions A.8 and A.9 are satis…ed, allowing resale reduces the seller's revenue. By contrast, if 4v 3 > 3v 1 and condition A.8 is not satis…ed -i.e., if 3v 1 < max f4v 3 ; 2 (v 1 + v 2 )g -allowing resale increases the seller's revenue. These results are analogous to the ones of Proposition 2.
